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ABSTRACT
Increasing popularity of online auctions and the associated frauds have drawn the attention of many researchers. It is
found [hal most of the auction sites prefer English auction to other auction mechanisms. The ease of adopting
multiple fake idenlities over the Internet nourishes shill bidding by fraudulent sellers in English auction. In this
paper we derive an equilibrium bidding strategy (0 counteract shill bidding in online English auction. Due to mere
fear of cheating, the buyers may deviate from their normal behavior. Thus, there is a chance that an honest
auctioneer may suffer from the loss of revenue because of lack of bidders' faith on him. Sometimes an honest
bidder has to pay more due to unfair bidding practices. It is imponant !O see which auction is most suitable from
bidder's and ill.lclioneer's point of view in cheating environment We also make a comparison of honest bidder's
expected gain and honest auctioneer's revenue loss for three importanllypes of auctions: English auction. first price
sealed-bid auction, and second price scaled-bid auction. The analysis of the results reveal that English auction
should be the mOSl preferred mechanism from both honest buyer's and honesl seller's point of view. This fact can be
uscd to explain the popularily of English auction over the Internet.
Keywords: Online English auction, Shill bidding, equilibrium bidding strategy, buyer's expected gam, seller's
expected revenue loss.
INTRODUCTION
Online auctions account for a large volume of economic activities over the Internet. Lack of security has created a
conducive environment for adopting unfair practices by bidders and auclioneers. Internet Fraud Complaint Center
(lFCC) reports lhat Internet auction fraud comprises 64% and 46%of referred complaint in lhe years 2001 and 2002
respectively rI]. IFCC classifies auction frauds into six categories: Non-delivery of goods, miss represenlation of the
ilems, triangulation, fee staking, selling of black-market goods, multiple bidding and shill bidding [2]. The last lwo
categories of fraud arc termed as cheating.
As noted by Chui and Zwick [3] most auctions that run over the Internet are English outcry type. Shill bidding is an
age-old problem in traditional English auctions. Shill bidding is intentional fake bidding by the seller to drive up the
price of his/her own item that is up for bid. This is accomplished by the seller himself or by someone colluded with
the seller. We consider the problem of shill bidding in English auction from three different perspectives.
Firslly, when a bidder is aware of shill bidding he may show unanticipated behavior. For example, a bidder may bid
a value much less lhan his personal valuation of the item to avoid the trap of possible shilling. Such low bid values
2
may obstruct his winning process. Thus an important question is - what should be the equilibrium bidding strategy
of an honest bidder to fight against shilling?
Secondly, when a buyer has the option for buying an item from different sites through cJifferent auction mechanisms
he will be in a cJilemma to select the appropriaLe mechanism which can help him to fctch the item in the lowest
possible value. All the auction sites are prone to cheating. Thus, in spite of its popularity _ Is cheating English
auction is the best from bidder's perspective?
Thirdly, due to the lack of privacy and security measure.-; in the online auction sites the bidders will always have the
fear of cheating. Such imaginary fene of the bidders can lead to a revenue loss for an honest auctioneer. As noted by
Porter and Shoham [4], even if the auctioneer docs not cheat, the mere fear of cheating by the biddcrs resull into a
loss of revenue. An auctioneer also has the freedom to choose a site with appropriate auction mechanism to sell his
item. In such an environmenL of insecurity and doubt - Should an honest auctioneer adopt English auction as the
mechanism to sell his item?
This paper addresses the above questions in the following way:
(I) Developing an equilibrium bidding strategy for the bidders In the English auction when there is shill
bidding.
(2) Comparing an honest bidder's expected gain in three important types of auction (English auction, First
price sealed-bid auction, and Second price sealed-bid auction).
(3) Comparing an honest auctioneer's revenue loss (when compared to revenue from the optimal auction) for
Lhe above three types of auctions.
We refer the work of Porter and Shoham L4J for understanding bidders' behavior in cheating first price and second
price sealed-bid auction. We usc the same setting used by them for understanding shill bidding in English auction
and make the three types of auctions comparable.
The rest of the paper is organized a.~ follows. First various types of auctions found in the real world and the ba.~is of
these variations are discussed. Followed by a discussion on cheating in electronic auction which includes a
taxonomy of cheating and lypes of cheaLing possible in three important auction mechanisms. Next an equilibrium
bidding strategy in English auction is derived. Using this strategy as the winner's bidding strategy, in the subsequent
two secLions, three types of auctions arc compared from bidders' and auctioneer's point of view. Before concluding
the paper, a survey of the related works that ha.~ motivated this research is presented.
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INTERNET AUCTIONS
McAfee and McMillan [5] dcfine an auction as a market institution with an explicit set ofmles determining resource
allocation and prices on the ba~is of bids from the market participant. An auction may consist of three basic
activities: receiving bids, supplying intermediate information and clearing. Any auction atlea~t has the first and the
third activities. Wurman el al [6], classify auctions by a set of orthogonal fealures: ratio of buyer-seller, duration
time, closing conJitions, settlement price, and information revealed. Ratio of buyer-seller determines whether an
auction allows multiple buyers or sellers. Three possible combinations are: one to many, many to one, and many to
many. A restriction to "one" indicate.~ that the auction is single-sided (i.e. existence of sole buyer or seller). An
auction with many to many buyer-seller ralio is called double-sided auction. Duration time classifies auctions into
single-round and multi-round auctions. At the end of each round some matching algorithm produces an allocation.
Closing conditions determine when an auction ends. Auctions could close when a pre-specified time is reached, after
a period of inactivity, or when a reserve price is reached. Settlement price is the price that a bid winner pays for the
auction. The policies determining settlement price can be the Mth and (M+[)st or chronological malching policies
[6]. The first and second price policies used by English and Second price sealetl-bid (Vickrey) auction respectively
are special cases of Mth and (M+l)st price policies. Information revealed determines what information is disclosed
during and aftcr the auction. The revealed information can be price quote, order book, transaction history, and so on
[7]. Price quote informs participants of the hypothetical auction clear result. Order book refers to the current set of
active bids. Transaction history is thc selected pUblicized information about past uansactions, including the prices,
quantities or even the idcntities of the transaction agents. Auctions revealing no inlermediate information are called
"sealed-bid" auctions. Based on these features approximalely 25 million types of auctions are possible. We
concentrate on single side auctions.
There exist threc broad categories of single sided action mechanisms: English auction, sealed-bid auction and Dutch
auction. In English auction known as open cry auction, the price of the product increases with time as bidders
compete with each other. At the end of the auction the highest bidder can take the item after paying the price he
bids. This kind of auction has many disadvantages: (1) Time to conduct the auction is very high. (2) Many round of
communication needs to take place and (3) Reveals maximum amount of information to both bidder and the
auctioneer. This however associates economic advantages to both the auctioneer and the bidders. Auctioneer gets the
highest possible value for the item. The bidder who is most interested to buy has a chance to out bid the competitors.
Dutch auction on the other hand is decreasing price in nature. The auctioneer sets an expected price for the product
and decreases the price at each time unit till some bidder bids. The first bidder takes the item. This auction type
reveals the least amount of information and is most privacy preserving. This however is very time consuming and
nOl economically efficient for the both auclioneer and the bidder.
In case of sealed-bid auction each party sends a sealed-bid for the item to an auctioneer who opens all the entire bids
after a predefined time period. The highest bidder gets the ilem. There are twO variations of sealed-bid auctions
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differentiated by the settlement price policy. In case oftirst pricc sealed-bid auctions the highest bidder pays exactly
the amount he bids where as in case second price sealed-bid auction the highest bidder pays the amount of (he
second highest bid. The second price auction is otherwise known as Vickrey Auction based on the name of its
designer William Vickrey 18J. The advantages are: (I) Time preserving as only two rounds of communication take
place. (2) In case of second price auction the most interested party gets the item in most economic terms.
In the real world most of the important auctions are sealed· bid in nature. On the contrary most Internet auctions are
of open out cry lype. According to [3], about 88% Internet auctions are English auction and its variants (Straight
and Yankee auctions). English auction and straight auction are similar. Yankee auctions bid on multiple items. The
winners are determined by ranking bids in order of highest price, then by largest quantity, and then by earliest time.
Dutch auction consists of I% of Internet auction. Other forms of auctions, such as Vickery auction and double
auction, account for the rest II %. The reasons why English auction and its variants are popular with online auctions
are: (I) English auction is well understood by all consumers, not just economists. (2) A typical online auction will
la~t for several days to allow more bidders to participate. This rules out those auctions that need to be finished within
a short time span, such as Dutch auction. (3) The possibility of cheating prevents sealed-auctions being widely
accepted.
CHEATING IN ELECTRONIC AUCTION
Cheating is a common phenomenon in Internet auctions. According to [9], Internet auction fraud accounts for 87%
of all online crime. We outline the reasons that cheating occurs frequently in Internet Auction.
• Cheap pseudonyms facilitate cheating in Internet auctions [IS}.
• Lack of personal contact prevent... bidders or sellers from identifying the suspicious entities [16J.
• The tolerance of bidders motivates the cheating. Harris survey (hltp:flwww.harrispollonline.com) reports
thal 21 % buyers take no action when they have problems in Internet transactions.
• Openness of Internet auction increases the chance of successful cheating. For example. the chance thal an
honest bidder will overbid shill bids in Internet auction is larger than in traditional auction given the large
number of potential bidders in Internet auction.
The lype of cheating possible is dependent on the auction mechanism. In this section we first give a taxonomy of
cheating in electronic auction. Followed by, their possibility in three major types of auctions: English. second price
sealed-bid and first price sealed·bid.
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Taxonomy of Cheating
We build taxonomy of cheating in eleclronic auctions based on the literatures. The cheating can be induced either by
the bidder or the auctioneer. A cheating seller tries to selI the item in a price as high as possible in order to increase
his expected revenue. Interest of the buyer is JUSl the opposite. Figure 1 illustrates the taxonomy.
ICheating in Auction I
I
I I
I Induced by bidder I I Induced by auctioneer I
I I
I I I I I
Multiple bidding Bid shading Rings Shill bidding False bids
Figure I: Cheating in eleclronic auction
Multiple bidding: A bidder can places multiple bids on the same item using different alia~es LI5].
Bid shading: If the bids are open a bidder tends to bid below his valuation of the product aner examining the entries
of O!her bidders. This is called bid shading [10].
RillgS: Sometimes some bidders form a coalition called the ring. These ring members collude nO! to compete with
each other and raise the price of the object [14].
Shill bidding: A corrupt auctioneer can appoint shills who place fake bids simply to increase the price of the item
without the intention of buying it [22, 23].
False bids: An auctioneer can profitably cheat in a second price sealed-bid auction by looking at the bids before the
auction clears and submitting an extra bid just below the price of the highest bid. Such extra bids are often called
false bids [4].
Cheating in Second price Sealed-Bid Auction
As proposed by Vickrey [8] the second price sealed-bid auctions have many advantages for bOlh buyers and sellers.
In spite of those advantages, the Vickrey auctions arc rare outside the financial market. Rothkopf, Teisberg and
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Khan [10] offer two explanations for its rarity. One of the explanations is the fear of auctioneers cheating. An
auctioneer can profitably cheat in second price auction by looking al the bids before the auction clears and
submitting an extra bid [4). The value of such alalse bid is almost same as that of the winners bid. For example if
the highest bid is $IQOO and the second highest bid is $ 800,then a cheating seller can introduce a false bid of value
$999. So the winner ha.~ to pay $999 (Almost same as his bid) instead of $800, and thus decreasing the expected
gain of the winner. Rothkopf and Harstad [10] have shown that if the cheating of a seller is found the buyers start
shading their bids and in the long run the second price auction becomes less profitable Hmn any other auction.
Shohnm and Potter note that even when the seIer is not cheating the mere fear of cheating makes the buyers shade
their bids.
Cheating in First Price Sealed-Bid Auction
Unlike second price auction a seller can not cheal in a first price. But a bidder can cheal in a first price aucLion by
bidding a value below his valuation of the product (bid shading) in order to have a positive utility if he wins [4J. In
the internet environment due to lack of security measures enables the bidders to see others' bids before the auction
closes. So the cheating bidders who have access to such information can go on revising their bids with mUltiple
identities in order to bid the minimum amount necessary to win the bid. Thus a scenario equivalent to English
auclion will emerge in which all the cheating agents keep on revising their bid until all but one cheater wants the
good at the current winning price.
Cheating In English Auction
Cheating in English auction can take place either in the fonn of shill bidding or multiple bidding [22,23]. In case of
shill bidding the auclioneer cheats whereas in case of mulLiple bidding a biduer cheats.
A shill tries to escalate the price wilhout the intention of buying it. In this process occasionally the shill wins the
auction irno other higher bid comes from the other bidders. So the item to be sold remains Wilh the auctioneer. Such
items are re-auctioned at a latter time. If the ilem is auctioned in a site which does nOl charge any entry fee then the
auctioneer neither loses nor gains in the process of shill hidding. But if there is some eOlry fee then the auctioneer
has to bear the loss. This scenario of seller's cheating in English auclion is completely different from lhal of Ihe
second price auction. In case of second price auction the seller can increase his profit up to the declared bid price of
lhe winner. This declared bid price may be less than or equal to the maximum valualion of the producl by the
winner. On the contrary, in case of English aucLion the seller can urive the bidders to go up to their maximum
valuation.
In case of 1IIIlIlipie bidding a cheating agent submits many bids adopting multiple identities. Some of these bids arc
higher than that of their personal valuation of the product. They drive the bid to such an extent that no olher bidder
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dares to bid and withdraw themselves from the auction. At this point the cheater also withdraws all his bids except
the one lowest value. So he acquires the product in a much cheaper price increa.~ing his own gain. This kind of
cheating is possible in the sites that allow bid withdrawal.
THE EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGY FOR ONLINE ENGLISH AUCTION
As mentioned earlier, cheating take place in English auction in the form of multiple bidding and/or shill bidding. In
the cUlTen( model we assume thatlhe auction site does not allow bid withdrawal. Thus we remove the possibilily of
cheming through multiple bidding. We also assume that the probabililY of a shill winning the auction is zero. With
these assumptions, in this section, we develop equilibrium bidding strategy for English auction when there is
shilling. We adopt the same formulation used in [4] and adopt the same variables and symbols to make both the
works comparable.
Problem Formulation
We consider the auction for a single indivisible object. The auction consists of N-l bidders and an auctioneer. Each
bidder associates two values with the product - the reservation value and the bid. The reservation value is the
maximum price a bidder is willing to pay for the product based on his personal valuation. This information is private
to each bidder. A bid on the other hand is the publicly declared price that a bidder is willing to pay for the product.
Each bidder has a reservation value BJ (i = 1,2,...N) for the object. Without the loss of generality we assume
B, E [0,1]. Each agent's reservation value is independently drawn from a cumulative distribution function (cd/) F
over [0, IJ, where F(O) = 0 and F(I) = 1. We assume F(.) is stricLly increasing and differentiable in the interval fO, I].
The derivative of cd/. f(B) is then the probability density function (pdf). Each bidder knows his reservation value
and the distribution F of other agents. A bidding strategy b; : lO,I] -) [0,1] maps a bidder's reservation value to its
bid. As we mention earlier B=(B1,B2 , •• .Bn ) is the vector of reservation values of all the agents and
b(B) = (b l (BI ), b2 (B2 ), ••h. (B.)) is the vector of bids.
An honesl bidder i can bid up to his reservation value, i.e. B, ~ h, (B,). On the other hand a dishonest bidder (shill))
can bid well above his reservation value in order to escalate the bid values of the honest bidders, Le. B
J
S hJ(OJ)'
According to assumption that the shill never wins the auction, so his bid value has to be Jess than that of the





Bidder's Expected Gain (Utility)
The expected utility (gain) of a winner is the difference between his reservation value and his expected payment.
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The expected gain of a buyer is defined by Riley and Samuelson [II] as follows:
Expected Buyers Gain = Probability of Winning *(Reservation Value - Bid)
= Probability of Winning *( 8; -IJ; (8 j » (I)
(3)
As per the model an honest bidder can win this auction if his final bid is higher than that of the reservation values of
all olher honest bidders and bids of all the dishonest bidders (shills).TIlis fact can be formalized in the similar way as
that of tirst price auction [41 as follows: Let the seller has a reservation value 8, ' which is a constant for a specific
auction. The shill's bid has to be greater than that of the seller's reservation value. Il is also less Ulan that of the
reservation value of the winner (honest bidder) so that the shill's probability of winning to zero. The probabililY that




) $.(},)= F(B,)-F(B,) . Since it is not profitable for a seller
to accept any bid below his reservation value [111, it makes F(B,) = 0 .Thus the probability thai bidder i has a higher
bid than a cheater can be represented by F(B,). Each honest bidder's reservation value has to be less than that of the
bid value of the winner. So the probabililY that an honest bidder's bid is it is higher than thal of another honest
bidder is F(b; (B; n. So the probability that an honest agent bid is higher than that of any other agent is the weighted
average these two probabilities, Ule weights being the probability of cheating (P') and non-cheating (I _ ph)
respectively. ProbabililY that he wins the auction is therefore this probabililY raised to the power N-l (His bid is
higher than other N-I agents). This can be represented as:
[ph .F(B,)+(I- p. ).F(b, (8, nY-1 (2)
Thus, we can write bidder ;'s expected uti lily as:
£0_, Il, (b(B), fi" ,B,) == (B, -h, (B, ».[ph .F(B,)+(1- ph ).F(b, (B, n]"'-I
B_, is the vector of reservation values of all the agents excepl the agent i.
Equilibrium
Our aim is to find the equilibrium bidding strategy of an honest agent in English auction in the presence of shills. It
is assumed thal the agents (bidders) are rational and maximizes their utility. All the dishonesl agents bid a higher
then their reservation value, all the honest agents bid according to a symmetric bidding strategy. To find the
equilibrium bidding strategy, we will maximize the expected utility function (Equation 3) by taking its derivatives
with respecl to b;(B;) and setting it to zero. The equilibriumb; (B;) , derived from this equation is presented in
theorem I. This theorem is similar to that of theorem 3 of [4] and can be proved accordingly.
Theorem I; In an English auction in which each bidder cheats with the probability ph , il is a Bayes Nash
equilibrium for each non-cheating bidder i (0 bid according to the strategy that is a fixed point in the following
equation:
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r(pb .F(x)+(l- pb).F(b, (X)))N-l dx
(Pb .F(B,).+(1- p' ).F(b, (B,)))N I (4)
Proof:
We define fA :[O,b, (B,)] ~ LO,!] as the inverse function of b i (B;). That is, i[ lakes the bid of the <lgenl i as the input
and returns [he reservation value Bj [hat induces this bid. Thus, we can rewrite bidder ;'s expected utility as;
(5)
Fi"di"g (he eljuilibrium
The agent i's reservation value is private and is constant for him in the expected ulility function. To find the
equilibrium bi (Bj ), we take [he derivative and set it to zero.
0= [(B, -b, (B, )).(N _I).(po.F(¢,(b, (B, )))+ (1- P").F(b, (B, )))N-'.
(p' .f(¢, (b, (B, )))1;(b, (B,)) +(1- p' ).f(b, (B, )))]-
(P" .F(¢,(b, (B,)))+ (1- P").F(b, (B, )))N-'
To further simplify we use the formula f'(x) = , I where g(x) is the inverse function of f(x). Plugging in
g ([(x))
I
function from our setting gives us: ¢;(b; (Bi )) =-,- Applying both this equation and ¢,(b,(B,)) = B, gives us;
b, (B,)
• I •0= [(B, -b, (B,)).(N -I).(P .f(B,).-,-+ (1- P ).f(b,(B,)))]-
bJBi )
(P" F(B,) +(1- P·).F(b,(B,)))
Rearranging the terms yields:
_ B (p/' .F(B;)+ (1- pl').F(bi(B;)))h;(Oj)
b,(B,)- ,- (N-I).(P".f(B,).+(I-P').f(b,(B,))h;(B,j) (6)
In order to verify Equation 4, we firsllake its derivative:
equationThis(pb .F(B
j
). + (1_ pb ).F(bi (Bi m<1N-1l
(N -I).(P/' .F(Bj).+(l- pb).F(bi(Bi)))'H.
(P~.[(8.).+ (1- pi').f(b. (Bi)hj ' (Bj )). (1, (pi' .F(x)+(1- pb ).F(bi(x))N-1 dx
, I J) Jb, (B,)=I-[[
simplifies to:
, (N - 1).(P'.f(().). +(I - P~).f (b,(B,))hj ' (Bi )). ro, (pi' .F(x) +(1- P').F(bi(x))N-1 dxb (B - ' JI
, j) - (pb .F(B;).+ (1_ pb).F(bi(Bi)))N
Plugging this equation in the numerator of Equation 6 yields Equation 4. o
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Uniform distribution as a special case
Here we consider uniform distribution as a special case This result, like that of the first price auction [4J, is
particularly robust for uniform distribution.
Corollary I. In the English auction where the shills cheat with probability ph, and F(O,) = 0" it is a Bayes.Nash
equilibrium for each non cheating agent to bid according to the strategy b, (0,) = N;; 10,.
The proof of this can be found in the appendix.
Proof: Putting F(B,) = B, in equation 4 yields:
r(pi, .x+(1- pb))}, (X»H-l dx
(P" .0, +(1- P")b, (8, »,Y J
Now plugging the strategy b,((),) = N -1 0, ' inlo this equation in order to verify this as a fixed point we get:
N
[ '(P".X+(I_Pl,).N-IX)N-1dX ['XN-ldX NN (1/ N)B,
b,(O,) =B, -"'---------,"'-.,-----=0, - ) N 1 =0, 0'-'
(P".o,+(1_pb).N-I O,)N-l 0, ,
N




Cheating brings shon term benefits to the cheater. The ease of adopting fake and multiple identities boosts the
cheaters' confidence of not loosing reputation when they are caught. With state-of-the-art technologies, it is difficult
to prevent cheating in Internet auctions. Law enforcement is also difficult over the Internet. In this situation it is
worth seeing which type of auction is robust in the online marketplace. In Ulis section we compare two types of
scaled-bid auction with the English auction from a non-cheater's point of view. A non-cheater can be an auctioneer
or a bidder. We analyze three types of auction in the specific case where the reservation values are drawn from
uniform distribution.
Comparison from Honest Bidder's Per.~pective
Suppose an honest bidder has the option for choosing the type of auction in a cheating environment Hc should have
the fair idea whether his expected gains are same or different in each type of auctions. So that he can choose a site
accordingly. We consider the definition of expected gain of a buyer by Riley and Samuelson [11] represented in
Equation I.
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The probability of cheating and the equilibrium bidding strategy for an honest bidder in English auction are given in
Equation 2 and Equation 4 respectively. We refer the work of Porter and Shoham [41 for understanding cheating in
sealed-bid auctions and adopt lhe probabilities of cheating and equilibrium strategies as derived by them for both
first price and second price auction.
The expected gain of the winner is considered as the expecled revenue loss for the seller [4]. As specified earlier the
expected gain is the difference between the winner's reservalion value and the final bid. Thus, if we assume the
expected revenue loss as defied by [4], in rurn we assume thaI when there is no cheating the bidder would have
placed the final bid equal to that of his reservation value ~ which seldom is the case. So in the following paragraph
we present a different approach for evaluating thc expected revcnue loss of a seller.
Comparison from Honest Allctioneer's Perspeclive
We define expected revenue loss to be the difference between the maximum possible expected revenue in the non-
cheating environment and expected revenue in cheating environment. The expected revenue for a seller is defined
Riley and Samuelson [11] to be N times the expectations on the expected payment of a typical buyer. Assuming that




Whcre, P(B) is thc expected payment by a single buyer and P(Bj )=Prob { b(Bj ) is high bid} b(B;).
(7)
We use lhe fact that the optimal auctions maximize a seller's expected revenue 1[2]. According to rcvenue
equivalence theorem the expected revcnues from all the optimal auctions are samc fl2]. We refer Riley and
Samuelson [1 [J for linding the expected revcnue in a non-chcating environment for any optimal auction using the
following formula:
"
R = N JIB F'(B)+ F(B)]F'-' (B)dB
,
The expected revenue in case of three Lypes of cheating auctions can be derived from Equation 7.
Uniform Dislributioll as a special case
(8)
Now we can derivc the expected gain of the winner and revenue loss for an honest biddcr, assuming that all the
bidders draw their bids from a uniform distribution and the winner bids according to the equilibrium bidding
slrategy. Following the work of Parler and Shoham [4) we say, the equilibrium bidding strategy b,eB,) in case of
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N -I
uniform distribution for second and first price auction are -"----'-(J, (P" is the probability of cheating in the
N-I+P'
second price auction) and N -I e, respectively. Corollary I gives the equilibrium bidding strategy in the English
N
auction. It can be easily verified Lhat when F(e) = e • the probability of winning in second price, first price and





Theorem 2: In Lhe second price auction where an auctioneer cheal,> with probability If, the winner bids according to
the equilibrium bidding strategy, and F(B) = (J then the expected gain nfthe winner is P' eN
N-I+P' ,
Theorem 3: In the first price auction where the bidders cheat with probability P". the winner bids according to the
(N_P")h--l B"
equilibrium bidding strategy, and F(()) = () then the expected gain of the winner is ~'----'-c!-_
Nil I
Theorem 4: In the English auction where the shills cheat with probability ph, the winner bids according to the
(N -I + p'')'''-l II
equilibrium bidding strategy, and F(()) = () then the expected gain of the winner is Nil (),
These results can be easily verified by appropriately replacing the values of probability of winning and b, (8
1
) in
equation 1 for each type of auction forms. Some important observations can be made from the above theorems. If
the probability of cheating is 1 (certain) second price auction and English auction generate the same expected gain
which is lower than the expected gain in first price auction. In case of first price and second price auction the seller
cheats, thus the expected gain of the buyer decreases. Whereas, in first price auction, the buyers' shade there bids in
order to increase their expected gain. When the probability of cheating is 0.5, first price auction and English auction
gcnerate same expected gain for the buyer which is higher than the expected gain from second price auction.
We now find the expected revenue loss for an honest seller. When the values are drawn from a uniform distribution,






Theorem 5: In the second price auction where an auctioneer cheats with probabilhy pc, the winner bids according to
the equilibrium bidding strategy, and F(B) = B then the seller's expected revenue loss is
[ N(N -1+2P') B BN
(N+l)(N-l+P') 1- 11 ,
Theorem 6: In the first price auction where the bidders cheat with probability P", the winner bids according to the
equilibrium bidding strategy, and F(B) = B then the seller's expected revenue loss is
2N N(N+I)_(N_r)N-'(N_I) B-1 BN
l NN-' (N + I) , 1 I
Theorem 7: In the English auction where the shills cheat with probability ph, the winner bids according to the





These resulL<; can be verified by replacing the variables approprialely in equation (7) and subtracting the resull from
equalion (9). II can be found that when the probability of chealing is 1 the scller's revenue loss is negative
(0 < B, :S: I ). In other words the seller does not suffer a loss of revenue in case of second price auction when there is
cheating. This is true because seller cheats in the second price auction by placing a fake bid increases his revenue
but he never wins the auction. This is not the case for other two lypes of auctions. The seller makes a loss in these
auctions if the left hand side of the bracketed expression becomes greater than J. In the following section we
experimentally show the revenue loss curves to visualize this result.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the last section we used uniform distribution to compare three auction types. Such analytical comparison becomes
difficult with other distributions. Moreover the results can be visualized and comprehended if shown graphically.
So, in this section we present the experimental results of comparison of three types of cheating auction. We consider




an arbitrary polynomial distribution (F(B,) = -.!..B,' +~B,). Throughout this section we
2 2
a<;sume the transactions are raking place in a highly cheating environment. We assume probability of cheating to be
0.9 for each type of auction.
Comparison from Honest Bidder's Perspective
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Figure 2- (a), (b) and (c) shows lhe comparalive plots for expected buyer's !lain vs. the reservalion values for
uniform, exponential and polynomial distribution respectively when the number of buyer's is equal 10 25. The nature
of the curves is same irrcspective of the distribution. So we can safely assume that this result holds for other
dislribution of the reservation value (8). The observations are:
(1) The buyer's expected gain is same for second price and English auction when cheating takes place. The seller
cheats in both these cases - In second price auction by placing a fake bid and in English auction by shilling. The
awareness of cheatin!l by the seller makes the bidders shade their bids, hence the gain.
(2) Expected gain from the chealin!l first price auclion is less than other two auclions. This result is quile peculiar
because in first price auclion the buyers cheat the seller by shading their bid where as in other two uuctions the
buyers act defensively a!lainst seller's chealing. So it turns out that the buyers can get more expected revenue when
the seller cheats lhan when they cheat lhe seller. Or in olher words they shade their bid more when they arc awarc
of cheating than cheating them selves.
(3) Irrespeclive of the auclion mechanism a buyer can have some gain only when his personal valuation of the
product (reservation value, 8 ) is very high. The buyers, who do not value the product very much if wins the
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Figure 2 Comparative buyer's expected gain plots for various distributions when N=25
Figure 2 (d) shows the buyer's expected gain for unifonn distribution, English auction and different number of
competing buyers. It turns out that the expected gain decreases when the number of buyers increase in the system.
The seller can exploit this opportunity particularly in English auction [0 introduce more number of shills to a give
the buyer an idea of intense competition. We got similar results for other type of auctions and other distributions.
Thus irrespective of the distribution of the reservation value and underlying auction mechanism, the seller can
deceive the buyers by falsely showing a high number of competing bidders and can induce increased the bid values.
Comparison from Honest Auctioneer's Perspective
In this section we compare the expected revenue loss for an honest seller in cheating environment compared to the
expected revenue from any optimal auction in non-cheating environment. It should be kept in mind that the expected
revenue is N times expected payment by all the buyers assuming thal all the buyers have equal chance of winning.
The figures 3 - (a), (b) and (c) shows the comparative seller's expected revenue loss plots for uniform distributions
and different numbers of competing bidders. Following are the observations from these figures:
(1) In first price auction the seller never cheats and the buyers shade their bids to increase their expected gain. Thus
this bid shading by each individual buyer will contribute to make revenue loss for the seller. Figure 3 (a) confirms
this fact and shows that when the number of buyers in the system is higher than 5, the expected revenue loss
becomes non-negative. Even for lower number of buyers in the system there is a loss when the bids are drawn from
a higher B value. Or in other words when the competition becomes intense either in terms of the number of
competing buyers andlor each buyer have a high valuation of the product, the buyers shade their bids more and
more.
(2) The expected revenue loss in case of second price auction is never positive (Figure 3 (b)). Which means a seller
never makes a loss if adopts second price auction as the mechanism in an environment where the buyers are aware
of cheating than what he would have got in a non-cheating optimal auction. Thus, when the number of buyer's
increases in the system the buyers shade their bid more and the revenue loss tends to be zero. A seller can cheat in a
second price auction by introducing a fake bid. If he chooses to do so then he can increase his revenue but there is
no chance of seller winning the auction.
(3) It is found from Figure 3 (c) thal the expected revenue loss in English auction for the higher values of B is
positive. But for the higher values of B the nature of the curves are similar 10 the second price auction. This fact
can be interpreted in the following way. The nature of seller's cheating in English auction is different from that of
the second price auction. During the process of shilling there is a chance that the shill may win which contributes to
16
increase the expected revenue [ass in English auction. When the bid values are drove up very high by the shill the
chance of shill winning the auction also becomes very high leading to a positive expected revenue loss towards the
higher values of 8 .
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Figure 3 Comparative seller's expected revenue loss plots for uniform distribution and different number of buyers
The figures 4 - (a), (b) and (c) shows the comparative sellers expecled revenue loss plots for three distributions and
25 numbers of competing bidders show similar results. Irrespective of the distribution, for lower reservation values
the expected revenue Joss for the seller is zero. The second price auction always give.~ a negative loss for higher
values of8. Maximum revenue loss for a seller occurs in case of first price auction independent of the dislribution
of8 . Revenue loss in case of English auction for higher () values is less than that of the first price auction.
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Figure 3 Comparative seller's expected revenue loss plots for various distributions when N=25
After consolidating all the result!i !iome of the interesting observations are:
(I)The bidders shade their bid more while counteracting cheating by the seller in second price and English auction
than the cheating by the fellow buyers in first price auction.
(2) Cheating has very little effect on bidder's expected gain and seller's revenue loss for the lower bid values and
very high number of bidders in the sY!item.
(3) Both buyers and sellers are not likely to prefer first price auction compared to the other two types.
(4) Surpri!iingly the second price auction in spite of its rarity i!i found to be most preferable type of auction from
both buyers' and seller's point of view. We refer to the work of Rothkopf and Harstad [13] to explain this rather
strange result. They have shown using a dynamic modellhat if a seller adopts cheating in second price auction his
revenue will continue to decrease over the time and reach a stage where it will be less profitable than a first price
auction. Since our model is static in nature, we can assume thatlhat as the time passes the second price auction will
be no more profitable for the seller.
(5) Based on the above observations and particularly the assumption of decreasing profit in second price auction in
the last observation English auction emerges as the most preferable mechanism for both honest buyers and the
honest seller. It provides the highest expected gain for the winning buyer and very little revenue loss for the seller in
18
the cheating environment. This result can be used to explain the popularity of English auction over the Internet
where there is fear of cheating.
RELATED WORK
The study of bidder's behavior is an interesting field of research in the auction literature. Riley and Samuelson [I 1],
for example, present a framework for generating equilibrium bidding strategy for a large class of auctions. They also
provide a methodology for comparing all types of auctions in terms of bidder's and auctioneer's gains. Literature
admits cheating is a common phenomenon in the auclion process. Graham and Marshal [14]model the collusive
bidder behavior in second-price and English auction. In this type of cheating the bidders form a coalition called ring.
Ring members never compete seriously against each other. When one of the ring members wins, the gain is divided
equally among ring members. The authors eXlend the revenue equivalence of Lhe second-pricc and English auction
to accommodate such cooperative behavior. They conclude that both the auctioneer's reserve price and the expected
payoff to a ring member is an increasing function of the size of the coalition. Rothkopf and Harstad present two
models, namely static game-theoretic model and dynamic bid-taker reputation model, to exhibit that Vickery
auctions will be driven oUL by sealed-bid auctions when there exists possibility of cheating r13].In Vickrey auctions,
a bid-taker (seller) may introduce a fictitious bid just below the highest submitted bid after obscrving the submitted
bids such lhat the paymem of the winner will be increased. The game-theoretic model shows jf cheating exists only
the most dishonest type prefers Vickery auction to first-price auctions. The dynamic reputation model indicates thal
in lhe setting of repeated Vickcry auction, a dishonest bid-taker have no reason to conduct this kind of auclion
because he wi II be caught eventually and loose his reputation afterwards. In a combinalorial auction, multiple goods
are sold simultaneously. Bidders bid on any combination of goods. A dishonest bidder may submit false bids under
fake identilies, which is called false-name-bid. A protocol is false-name-proof if !ruth-telling without using false-
name bids is a dominant strategy for bidders. Yokoo el. a/. [15] prove that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)
mechanism is not faIse-name-proof. They conclude that when surplus function is concave over bidders the vca
mechanism is false-name-proof.
Internet based auctions are more prone to cheating due to the lack of security. Portcr and Shoham [4] derive the
equilibrium bidding strategies for an honest bidder who is aware of cheating in sealed-bid auctions. They consider
two forms of cheating. In case of second price aucLion a seller inserts a fake bid to increase the paymcnt of the
winner. In case of first price auction a bidder examines the competing bids and submits a bid to win the auction with
minimum payment. They also find the expected revenue loss for an honest seller due to the possibility of chealing.
Ba et. al. {16] propose to reduce online fraud through the use of reputation mechanism maintained by a trusted third
party. According LO their proposition a rusted third party not only issues a certificate but also maintains repulations
associated with the certificate holder. They define a trusted third party system stage game to formalize the online
transaction process with aid of trusted third parties and propose a symmetric sequential equilibrium strategy.
Kauffman and Wood [22] distinguish between two different types of shilling that exhibit different motivation and
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certain stage. While purpose of shill bidding is lo increase the seller's revenue, the multiple bidding is for decreasing
the revenue. It will be interesting to observe the effect when both type of cheating togelher takes place. Our model
a~sumes thal lhe shill never wins the auction. But in real-life sometimes the shills win. So this model can be
extended to accommodate this situalion
The auction process over the internet involves three parties- the buyer (bidder), lhe seller (auctioneer) and the site
that host,> lhe auctions. Much work has been done to see the reputalion effect of sellers. Some work can be done to
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